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I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust enforcement affects more than just price and output—it’s part of our
everyday lives, from the price of groceries at the market to the cost of prescription drugs.
— Senator Amy Klobuchar1
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a response to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Fellow,
Innovators Network Foundation. A research grant from the Filomen D’Agostino
and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at New York University School of Law
provided financial assistance for this article. I thank the participants at the NYU
Classical Liberal Institute/University of Nebraska College of Law conference on
“Understanding the Visible: The Undisputed Facts and Disputed Law of Platform
Antitrust” for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Press Release, Amy Klobuchar, Klobuchar Introduces Legislation to Modernize
Antitrust Enforcement and Promote Competition (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www
.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=A952CE13-DD98-4E2
7-8BBA-CACE520AF2EB [https://perma.unl.edu/W95C-MP5H] (introducing two
bills to amend the Clayton Act, see CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
search?q=%7B%22congress%22%3A%22116%22%2C%22source%22%3A%22legis
lation%22%2C%22search%22%3A%22klobuchar%22%7D&searchResultView
Type=expanded [https://perma.unl.edu/2ATE-7SU6] (last visited July 14, 2019)).
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On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in
Ohio v. American Express.2 The Court had granted certiorari on petition of the State of Ohio and ten other state plaintiffs in a suit originally brought by the United States Department of Justice and sixteen
states. Although the United States eventually joined Ohio in urging
the Supreme Court to reverse the lower court’s decision,3 it was the
State Solicitor of Ohio, Eric Murphy, who took the lead on oral
argument.
It didn’t take Justice Gorsuch long to start the questioning. One
minute and six seconds into Murphy’s argument, Justice Gorsuch
stopped him with this:
JUSTICE GORSUCH: We’re not here to protect competitors, right, Mr.
Murphy?
MR. MURPHY: Correct.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Or—or necessarily even merchants. The antitrust laws
are aimed at protecting consumers; you’d agree with that?
MR. MURPHY: Correct, although in this—
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So, given that, there’s no evidence of restricted
output in this case, correct?
MR. MURPHY: I—I would agree that it’s—there’s—it’s ambiguous. There’s
no [evidence] one way or the other about whether—whether it has restricted
output.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: And that’s normally what the antitrust laws care
about, is deadweight loss. That’s the primary concern of antitrust activity,
wouldn’t you agree?
MR. MURPHY: Correct. . . .4

Ohio lost the case. Justice Gorsuch joined the majority opinion.
Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. He began the dissent in a
somewhat curious way:
For more than 120 years, the American economy has prospered by charting
a middle path between pure laissez-faire and state capitalism, governed by an
antitrust law dedicated to the principle that markets, not individual firms and
certainly not political power, produce the optimal mixture of goods and services. By means of a strong antitrust law, the United States has sought to
avoid the danger of monopoly capitalism. Long gone, we hope, are the days
2. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) [hereinafter Amex].
3. The United States filed a brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari,
see Brief for the United States in Opposition, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 3485653, but eventually filed a brief in support of the petitioning States, styled “Brief for the United States as Respondent
Supporting Petitioners,” see Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL
6205804.
4. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(2018) (No. 16- 1454), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2017/16-1454_o7jp.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/E6PV-9JZA]. The recorded version of the oral argument is available at https://www.supremecourt
.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2017/16-1454 [https://perma.unl.edu/VM3Z-NQGB].
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when the great trusts presided unfettered by competition over the American
economy.
This lawsuit is emblematic of the American approach. Many governments
around the world have responded to concerns about the high fees that creditcard companies often charge merchants by regulating such fees directly. The
United States has not followed that approach. The Government instead filed
this lawsuit, which seeks to restore market competition . . . .5

Ohio v. American Express came to the Supreme Court as a fully
litigated rule of reason case. The government plaintiffs had won at
trial, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upended the district
court’s decision.6 Persuaded by American Express (Amex) that the district court’s market definition had not adequately taken account of the
two-sided aspect of Amex’s product, and without saying exactly how
the market should be defined, the court of appeals held that the district court “erred in excluding the market for cardholders from its relevant market definition.”7 Given this failure, the plaintiffs had not met
their “initial burden” of showing “net harm to Amex consumers as a
whole—that is, both cardholders and merchants.”8
It was these two aspects of the Second Circuit’s decision—how to
define the market and what proof was necessary for the plaintiffs to
meet their “initial burden” of showing anticompetitive effect—that
were to be the focus of the legal arguments before the Supreme Court.
So why did Justice Gorsuch lead with a question on consumer welfare,
output, and deadweight loss? And why did Justice Breyer lead with a
spirited defense of the “American approach” to using antitrust litigation, rather than government regulation, to restrain the power of the
“great trusts”?
The key to this debate between Justices Gorsuch and Breyer is history. The intriguing question is how this debate affected the decision
in American Express. The consequential question for antitrust analysis is whether the Supreme Court’s opinion got the rule of reason analysis right.
Taking the last question first, in this Article I argue that the
Court’s opinion muddled the rule of reason analysis instead of advancing it and misused the concept of “market” along the way. The opinion
also has implications for the consumer welfare debate that is now roiling antitrust’s waters, but, again, the opinion only confused our understanding of “consumer welfare” as a goal of antitrust. A correct
application of the rule of reason in this case, and a clear-eyed focus on
the ability of consumers to make choices in marketplace transactions,
5. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2290 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
6. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d,
838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
7. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 197.
8. Id. at 205–06.
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should have led the Court to a judgment in favor of the government
plaintiffs.
I begin in Part II with a general discussion of the debate over the
consumer welfare standard. In Part III of the Article I discuss the
overall rule of reason analysis that the Court applies; Part IV examines the effect of two-sidedness on this analysis. In Part V I return to
consumer welfare and its confusing use in this case.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE CONSUMER
WELFARE STANDARD
The argument between Justices Gorsuch and Breyer is almost a
literal replay of the 1960s argument between Robert Bork and Ward
Bowman on one side, and Harlan Blake and William Jones on the
other. It was played out initially in Fortune Magazine, subsequently
in the Columbia Law Review, and finally one-upped by Bork in his
famous book, The Antitrust Paradox.9
The heart of Bork’s argument is well-known. Antitrust law has a
single goal, which Bork called “consumer welfare.” Catchy the phrase
was, and the Supreme Court picked it up one year after the Antitrust
Paradox was published: “Antitrust is a consumer welfare prescription,” the Court wrote, citing Bork.10 Gorsuch’s opening questions are
a direct echo of Bork.
Breyer’s opening paragraph is a direct echo—almost a paraphrase—of a core argument that Blake/Jones made in their response
to Bork/Bowman. Blake/Jones wrote:
The great virtue of the competitive process is that it makes possible the
attainment of a viable economy with a minimum of political interference . . . Is
not this the aspect of antitrust which makes it uniquely American? . . .
...
[A]ntitrust operates to forestall concentrations of economic power which, if
allowed to develop unhindered, would call for much more intrusive government supervision of the economy. Reliance on competitive markets accommo-

9. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). For the Bork/Bowman and
Blake/Jones debate, see Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman Jr., The Crisis in
Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138 (1963); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman
Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965), responded to in Harlan
M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, FORTUNE, Aug. 1964, at
135; Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 377 (1965) [hereinafter In Defense of Antitrust]; Harlan M. Blake & William
K. Jones, Toward A Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422
(1965).
10. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
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dates our interest in material well-being with our distrust of concentrations of
political and economic power in private or governmental hands.11

The debate between Bork and Bowman and Blake and Jones—and
between Gorsuch and Breyer—is important for antitrust policy. Bork
argued that his single goal of consumer welfare was far preferable to
the “loose rhetoric” and “flabby thinking” behind the “many other benefits” that antitrust purportedly could advance.12
Blake and Jones, on the other hand, argued for multiple goals. In
addition to the goal of avoiding more intrusive government regulation
to deal with concentrated private power, Blake and Jones included:
freedom of choice for consumers (as well as for entrepreneurs); efficient allocation and use of resources; “minimizing maldistributions of
wealth” by preventing “sustained extractions of prices unrelated to
costs”; encouraging the formation of markets and assuring ease of entry; and protecting participants in markets—“particularly small businessmen”—against exclusionary practices.13 The bottom line for
Blake and Jones was that Congress was primarily motivated by a concern for the “abusive behavior of economic giants” and “sympathy for
their victims, consumers and businessmen deprived of alternatives
and opportunities.”14 Is it “even conceivable,” they asked rhetorically,
that Congress in 1890 “would pass an emotionally charged measure
like the Sherman Act out of an exclusive preoccupation with the idea
that prices should always equal marginal costs?”15
The question of antitrust’s goals is important, of course, but perhaps as consequential for the debate is the method for achieving those
goals. Multiple goals could call for multiple approaches—history, psychology, economics.16 This complicates analysis, but the problem of
multiple goals is actually deeper. For many of the multiple goals there
is no clear way to achieve them and no clear way to judge whether we
would be better off if one goal were advanced but at the cost of
another.

11. In Defense of Antitrust, supra note 9, at 382–83. See also Robert H. Jackson,
Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?, 71 U.S. L. REV. 575, 577 (1937) (“American business must make up its mind whether it favors the regulation by competition contemplated by our antitrust laws or the only probable alternative—
government control.”).
12. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 427–28 (1993 ed.) [hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX].
13. See In Defense of Antitrust, supra note 9, at 381, 384.
14. Id. at 384.
15. Id. For a later exposition of antitrust’s goals, see Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981).
16. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What
Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977).

324

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:319

By contrast, Bork offered a simpler tool to achieve his goal, “price
theory,”17 which required limited trade-offs and focused on a relatively simple relationship between price and output.18 Examining the
impact of The Antitrust Paradox fifteen years after its original publication, Bork wrote that although a major part of his argument was
about antitrust law’s goals, “the dispute over actual legal decisions
was carried on in terms of price theory.”19
The price theory that Bork used was not complicated. Bork pointed
out that his use of price theory did not require lawyers to become
“highly adept at economics.”20 The “simplest ideas are also the most
powerful and entirely adequate to the tasks of the law,” Bork wrote.21
Price theory, for Bork, was less about economic theory and more about
providing “a powerful tool of analysis” that made it possible “to win
arguments and to do so decisively.”22 Price theory, Bork pointed out,
was “a powerful form of rhetoric.”23
In truth, “consumer welfare” was also a powerful form of rhetoric.
The term was not only new to competition law discussion, but also to
economics when Bork published The Antitrust Paradox (he didn’t even
use it in the Columbia Law Review debate with Blake and Jones).
Economists at the time were concerned with social welfare (the welfare of all members of society) rather than only the welfare of consumers, but Bork wasn’t much concerned with real consumers either.24
Instead, he applied the label to what was really some form of total
welfare—“the wealth of the nation”—and not just what would benefit
real consumers.25 As Bork later explained, he viewed consumer welfare as synonymous with “economic efficiency,” and he used economic
17. For a fuller inquiry into what, exactly, price theory is and where it comes from,
see E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, J. ECON. LIT. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abs
tract=2444233 [https://perma.unl.edu/Q243-GVFZ].
18. Although Bork later recognized the trade-off between losses to allocative efficiency and increases to productive efficiency, see ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note
12, at 427, his original book was skeptical of having judges make such trade-offs
in an antitrust trial, see BORK, supra note 9, at 124–29.
19. See ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 12, at xiii.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. For a discussion of how the term “consumer welfare” was understood in economics, see Gregory J. Werden, Essays on Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy
at 2–5 (2009), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352032 [https://perma.unl.edu/
P4FC-3QLQ]. For an in-depth discussion of the economic theories behind “consumer welfare” and “total welfare,” see Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind
the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal of Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 455
(2018).
25. See BORK, supra note 9, at 90 (“Consumer welfare . . . is merely another term for
the wealth of the nation.”).
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reasoning (via price theory) to achieve it.26 That meant focusing on
increasing output and avoiding the deadweight welfare loss that
comes from a misallocation of resources. “In a word, the goal is maximum economic efficiency to make us as wealthy as possible.”27
Bork’s notion of “consumer welfare,” and the bases of his economic
arguments, have been constantly critiqued since the publication of
The Antitrust Paradox.28 An important aspect of this critique has been
a disagreement over what the term “consumer welfare” should actually mean. Is it really synonymous with efficiency? Hovenkamp argues
that it is not: “Under the modern (non-Borkean) consumer welfare
principle, low prices are the dog and efficiency is but the tail.”29 If it’s
really about low prices, is it low prices just to consumers? What about
intermediate buyers who are often the direct victims of price fixing
cartels and are often the plaintiffs in private antitrust litigation? And
if it’s low prices, what about non-price effects, for example, on quality
or innovation?
Courts and commentators have had little difficulty including intermediate purchasers and non-price effects,30 but their willingness to do
so suggests that “consumer welfare” sometimes functions more as a
slogan than a standard. Indeed, were we applying this standard to
really favor the consumer and to get low prices and high output,
wouldn’t we condemn excessively high pricing in itself? Doesn’t such
pricing have the exact effects that a “consumer welfare” standard appears to condemn, that is, resource misallocation plus a clear harm to
consumers who pay more than they should were markets working
properly?31 Yet, we have been reluctant to condemn such pricing
26. See Antitrust Paradox, supra note 12, at 427.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 142–49 (2011).
29. Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197329 [https://perma
.unl.edu/97H2-K6PK].
30. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 153 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (“Amex-accepting merchants and Amex cardholders are both technically
‘consumers’ of the services provided by Defendants”). See also FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (proof of reduction of competition to wholesalers is sufficient to show competitive harm; no need to prove impact on enduser consumer); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir.
2005) (district court focus on consumers who used false teeth, rather than on the
dealers and laboratories that purchased the teeth from the defendant manufacturer, was “clear error”); cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (harm to excluded nascent competitor; no proof of increased price to
consumers).
31. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019) (“Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and President Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in
1890, ‘protecting consumers from monopoly prices’ has been ‘the central concern
of antitrust.’ ”).
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under the antitrust laws (at least in the United States), indicating
that consumer welfare may be about more than just consumers and
more than just economic welfare.32
Whatever the ambiguities of the term “consumer welfare,” however, until recently it appeared that Bork had set the frame for the
debate over goals and that methods more than goals were being contested.33 Over time different economic theories, loosely labeled as
post-Chicago, have been advanced to challenge Bork’s easy-to-understand price theory, but the primacy of an economic approach to antitrust law and the importance of efficiency were generally accepted.34
Surprisingly to many, however, the current debate has shifted once
again to a serious discussion of goals and away from methods. There
are several reasons for the return of the goals debate. First, the data
look bad for antitrust. Recent scholarship has challenged the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, showing increasing concentration, either generally or in particular industries, increasing profit rates
accompanied by a decrease in entry into profitable industries, and an
increase in market power as measured by price-cost margins.35 Further, economists have traced an increasing skew in the distribution of
income and stagnant, virtually non-existent growth in wages.36 As one
32. For a review of the arguments over applying the Sherman Act to excessive pricing, see Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust Violation, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 711–16 (2019).
33. See Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2013) (“The
core debate is how to design and apply antitrust principles so that robust markets
are likely to result or be preserved, not what are the goals of antitrust.”).
34. For post-Chicago School economics in operation, see, e.g., Steven C. Salop, The
Raising Rivals’ Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, and
the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2017); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010) (reviewing development of economic analysis
of merger effects).
35. See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM 13–23 (2019) (describing
and explaining decades-long increase in market power); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF MARKET
POWER 4–6 (2016) (discussing increasing concentration across a number of industries, increasing rents, and declining rates of entry; suggesting that “barriers to
entry may have increased in many industries”), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/7JGB-4QZ7]; Hovenkamp, supra note 29 (citing sources);
Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment
in the U.S. 2 (Working Paper 2017) (data indicating that concentration and profitability have increased across most U.S. industries and that investment has
been “weak” relative to profitability since early 2000s) (using aggregate industry
data), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/IK_Comp_v4.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/U7JF-2K32].
36. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 24 (Arthur
Goldhammer, tr., 2014) (rising income inequality from 1970 to 2010) (Figure 1.1);
Hovenkamp, supra note 29 (“stagnant, virtually non-existent growth in wages”).
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commentator pointed out, these trends started in the 1980s, “about
the same time that Bork’s book was published and United States antitrust law began a significant rightward turn.”37
The second reason for the reemergence of the goals debate is that
the rise of the Internet has brought with it significant structural
changes in the economy. Not only have numerous major industries
been disrupted but new platform companies have increased in importance in the economy. In 2006 the five largest companies in the United
States were Exxon Mobil (oil), General Electric (heavy manufacturing), Citigroup and Bank of America (financial services), and
Microsoft. In 2017, four of the five were gone, replaced by technology
platform companies: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook. Only
Microsoft remained on the list from 2006.38
These five firms, dubbed the “Frightful Five,” have raised fears
about excessive power and control of peoples’ lives reminiscent of the
fears in the Gilded Age that sparked the Sherman Act.39 Responding
to a broad range of concerns—privacy and individual autonomy, functioning of the democratic process, impact on small (and not so small)
businesses—antitrust has suddenly gained a new political salience,
leading to the introduction of major antitrust reform bills in Congress.40 Commentators began looking backward for different approaches to antitrust, articulated before antitrust lost its way—to
Brandeis and the progressives of the early twentieth century,41 or to
Robert Jackson and Thurman Arnold at the end of the Roosevelt Administration,42 or to the enforcement and legislative efforts taken be37. Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 10.
38. See Jonathan Taplin, Is It Time to Break Up Google?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2pPP7To [https://perma.unl.edu/E2ZX-E7Z9] (data from S&P
Dow Jones Indices).
39. See Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2pwtHtt [https://perma.unl.edu/X2F4-ZVWT] (“We are, all
of us, in inescapable thrall to one of the handful of American technology companies that now dominate much of the global economy.”); Christopher Mimms, Amazon is Leading Tech’s Takeover of America, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2017), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-is-leading-techs-takeover-of-america-1497653164
[https://perma.unl.edu/X6TB-QYH6] (“America’s biggest tech companies are
spreading their tentacles . . . [P]ower and wealth will be concentrated in the
hands of a few companies in a way not seen since the Gilded Age.”).
40. See, e.g., Merger Enforcement Improvement Act, S.306, 116th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Jan. 13, 2019) (requiring parties to merger settlements to submit certain postmerger data for five years); Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion
Act of 2019, S.307, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 2019) (changing anti-merger
standard and requiring merging parties in certain transactions to bear the burden of proving lack of anticompetitive effect).
41. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018);
Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J.
EUR. COMPETITION LAW & PRAC. 131 (2018).
42. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Edge: Revitalizing U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Is Not Simply a Contest Between Brandeis and Bork—Look First to Thur-
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tween 1969 and 1979 to curb conglomerate and large mergers, to
break up major corporations, and to deal with no-fault monopoly and
shared oligopoly.43
The reemergence of the goals debate has had one ironic aspect.
Some commentators have responded by vigorously defending the consumer welfare standard against those who would enlarge antitrust’s
remit to include a broader set of goals, now labeled as “public interest.” These neo-consumer-welfarists do not argue for a limited role for
antitrust, as Bork had; indeed, these commentators are generally in
favor of strong enforcement. Instead, they argue that “stronger” enforcement is possible using the current analytical approach to antitrust that courts and commentators have favored since the 1970s.44
Although these commentators would certainly not call themselves
Neo-Borkeans, still they accept Bork’s rhetorical and policy turn, disagreeing more on method. In an unacknowledged tip of the hat to
Bork, for them, goals are one thing, but disputes over legal rules are
carried on in terms of applied economic theories.
III. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON
A.

The General Framework

Judges may be influenced by what they view as the purpose of the
laws they are interpreting, but they must mediate their policy views
through the legal doctrines at their disposal. The organizing doctrine
man Arnold, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Jan. 31, 2019), https://
equitablegrowth.org/revitalizing-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-is-not-simply-a-con
test-between-brandeis-and-bork-look-first-to-thurman-arnold/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/XQU5-PUYF]; Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks for the Inaugural
Jackson-Nash Address, Feb. 26, 2018 (discussing Jackson’s contribution to antitrust enforcement). For a full account of Arnold and his enforcement record, see
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
43. See Harry First, Woodstock Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1 (Apr. 2018),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180878 [https://perma.unl.edu/WJZ56D3M].
44. See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a
Sea of Doubt?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 (Dec. 13, 2017)
(testimony of Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute) (arguing for
vigorous enforcement using a “consumer welfare” standard and rejecting “populist claims”; “the consumer welfare standard is fully capable of meeting the challenges of the modern economy”), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/Moss_SJC-Sub-comm-Hearing_Consumer-Welfare_12.13.17.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/GYB4-65UP]; BAKER, supra note 36, at 202–09 (suggesting a number of political and legal arguments to deal with market power, but
urging litigants to “rely heavily on arguments rooted in modern economics”); Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714 (2018),
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/antitrustpopulism.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/3V9G-M9HK].
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available in the American Express case was the rule of reason, antitrust’s preferred decisional tool since the Court moved away from per
se rules in 1977 in Sylvania.45
The contractual restraint at issue in the American Express litigation was Amex’s “nondiscrimination provision” (NDP), which the parties and the Court generally referred to as an “antisteering”
provision.46 When a merchant accepts an Amex card the merchant
pays Amex for “merchant services” that Amex provides in clearing the
transaction and crediting the merchant with funds from the customer’s purchase. Generally, Amex’s charges to merchants for these
services are higher than Visa’s or MasterCard’s.47 Under the NDP, a
merchant could not attempt to attract or “steer” a customer to use the
merchant’s preferred card network by, for example, offering a 10% discount for using a Visa card, or free shipping for using a Discover
card.48 The NDP did not forbid offering customers a discount for using
cash or checks or debit cards, but this is a requirement of federal law
that Amex cannot change.49
Justice Thomas, writing for the 5–4 majority, begins his analysis
with what appears to be a noncontroversial statement of the rule of
reason framework. “The parties agree that a three-step, burden-shifting framework applies,” he writes.50
Step One: The plaintiff “has the initial burden to prove that the
challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that
harms consumers in the relevant market.”51 For this proposition he
relies on the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise,52 which does not mention either “substantial” or “consumers,” Von Kalinowski,53 which
45. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (explaining that
the rule of reason is the “prevailing standard of analysis”).
46. See, e.g., Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 2280, 2282.
48. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 149, 165 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
49. For a history of federal legislative intervention into discounts and surcharges for
cash, see Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017).
The Durbin Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 extended these provisions to debit cards, but only where
the merchant “does not differentiate on the basis of the issuer or the payment
card network.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2012). For the language of American Express’s nondisclosure provision, see American Express Merchant Reference
Guide–U.S.at § 3.2 (2019), https://www.americanexpress.com/content/dam/amex/
us/merchant/merchant-channel/US_RefGuide_October_2018-Final.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/5CCZ-86T5].
50. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. (citing P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law
§ 15.02[B] (4th ed. 2017)).
53. Id. (citing 1 J. Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 12.02[1] (2d
ed. 2017)).
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mentions “substantial” but not “consumers,” and a private Second Circuit case, which does not mention “substantial” or “consumers.”54
Step Two: The burden then “shifts to the defendant to show a
procompetitive rationale for the restraint.”55
Step Three: If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the “procompetitive efficiencies
could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means,”
that is, a less restrictive alternative.56
The dissenting Justices seem to go along with this three-step approach. Justice Breyer begins his dissent by saying that “I agree with
the majority and the parties” that the restriction should be evaluated
under the “three-step ‘rule of reason.’ ”57 He puts Step One this way:
“[A] court looks first at the agreement or restraint at issue to assess
whether it has had, or is likely to have, anticompetitive effects.”58 No
“substantial,” no “consumers.” For his phrasing Justice Breyer cites to
the Court’s decision in Indiana Federation of Dentists, but that case
does not quite use his language.59 Instead, the Court there asked
whether the restraint had the “potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition.”60 Justice Breyer then adds a bit more to Step One (Step
1 1/2?), pointing out that the Court normally asks whether the restraint
may “tend to impede competition” and whether the parties to the restraint “have sufficient economic or commercial power for the agreement to make a negative difference.”61 For Step Two, Justice Breyer
relies on Areeda and Hovenkamp: the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint “serves a legitimate objective.”62 Then
comes Step Three: the plaintiff can “still carry the day” by showing
that the “legitimate objective” can be met “in less restrictive ways” or
perhaps that “the agreement ‘on balance’ remains unreasonable” (Step
3 1/2?).63
If we compare the two statements of the rule of reason, we find
that the majority has three steps, but leaves out a step that is both
necessary and has been the subject of some criticism—the need to net
pro- and anti-competitive effects64—which really makes four steps.
54. Id. (citing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F. 2d 537,
543 (2d Cir. 1993)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2291.
59. See id. at 2291.
60. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).
61. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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The dissent actually seems to have five steps, not three. Why both
sides seem so intent on saying they have three steps is mysterious.
Although both parties present their rule of reason framework as if
their statements are noncontroversial and well-accepted, in fact they
are not. In the last Supreme Court case to apply the rule of reason,
FTC v. Actavis, we find Justice Breyer’s majority opinion leaving it to
the lower courts to structure antitrust litigation so as to answer the
“basic question” in a rule of reason analysis—“the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences”65—thereby mushing
together all three (five?) steps of the rule of reason analysis. In his
dissent in California Dental Association, Justice Breyer saw these
three steps: (1) whether the restrictions “have the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition,” quoting Indiana Federation of
Dentists;66 (2) whether the restrictions might be justified by “procompetitive tendencies or redeeming virtues,” a burden borne by the defendant;67 and (3) whether the restrictions “would likely have made a
real difference in the marketplace,”68 that is, did the parties “have
sufficient market power to make a difference?”69 No net, no less restrictive alternative, and no mention of harm to consumers.
Is it any wonder then that Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent in
Actavis, joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia, complained about the
“amorphous rule of reason”?70
B.

Step One

The Court in American Express never got past Step One, “In sum,
the plaintiffs have not satisfied the first step of the rule of reason.”71
Why not? Because they “have not carried their burden to prove anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.”72
The Court gave three reasons for why the plaintiffs did not satisfy
Step One: (1) they litigated the wrong market; (2) they focused on
price, but the wrong price; and (3) they did not prove a reduction in
output. At each of these steps the Court was wrong.
The plaintiffs sought to prove that there was a market for
merchant services. Credit card companies and merchants negotiate
around the price for these services, that is, how much merchants will
pay and what services the credit card company will provide. Those ne65. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 160 (2013).
66. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986)).
67. See id. at 786, 788.
68. Id. at 788.
69. Id. at 782.
70. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 160.
71. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018).
72. Id. at 2287.
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gotiations also involve detailed requirements that merchants must observe; these too are subject to some negotiation depending on the type
and size of the merchant. Credit card companies do, or could, compete
around those terms with other credit card companies; this competition
could take the form of efforts to provide merchants with better terms
as a way to enter the market and compete with other credit card companies, which is what Discover tried to do. This sounds like a market.
Defining markets is not just a descriptive exercise. “Market” is a
concept, an analytical tool to enable antitrust courts to focus on the
effects with which the antitrust laws are concerned. Presumably, the
core adverse effect is the ability to raise price without being disciplined by competitors. This, of course, is exactly what the plaintiffs
proved. Under what Amex called its “Value Recapture” program,
Amex raised prices at least twenty times between 2005 and 2010, in
different amounts to different industry segments, depending on the
different elasticities of demand these different merchants had for the
Amex card.73 Airlines saw a 7% to 15% increase over four years, increasing Amex’s pre-tax income by more than $90 million.74 “Everyday spend” merchants, like supermarkets and retailers, saw their
rates increase; 280,000 restaurants had their rates increased; and
over one million small merchants saw price increases.75 In all, Amex
increased its profits by more than $1.3 billion over a five-year period.76 This is not just proof of the existence of market power, as
shown through market share and entry barriers. This is proof of its
exercise.
The Court acknowledged that Amex increased its prices to
merchants, although the Court made it seem small to the casual
reader by stating that the average price increase in the merchant rate
over the period was 0.09% (which it was).77 Still, that was not proof of
anticompetitive effect for several interconnected reasons. The market
was not merchant services, it was “credit cards”;78 in this market
“only one product” is supplied, “transactions”;79 the plaintiffs did not

73. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 195–96 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
74. Id. at 196.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 197.
77. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
78. See, e.g., id. at 2283 (noting that the district court treated “credit-card market” as
two separate markets).
79. Id. at 2286 (quoting Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets:
The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
571, 580 (2006)).
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prove that the net price of transactions increased;80 and plaintiffs did
not prove a restriction in the output of transactions.81
The factual key to this line of reasoning is the idea that the product
that Amex is selling is transactions, a point that counsel for Amex
hammered home in oral argument.82 Looked at this way, the Court
saw credit card issuance and credit card acceptance as continuous,
even though issuance and acceptance are sold to different parties at
different prices and at different times.83 This led the Court to ask a
question that literally no one could answer: How much does a transaction cost? Presumably this would be the net of the price charged to
merchants (in individual transactions?) and whatever price consumers pay for the card (amortized membership fee minus rewards per
transaction). But who knows what that is since it appears nowhere
and Amex itself suppresses information regarding the amount
merchants pay by forbidding its merchants from offering customers a
better deal if they use a cheaper card. The economics experts who testified at trial for both sides made individual stabs at what the net
price might be, but even they couldn’t figure it out to the district
court’s satisfaction.84 If two PhD economists are unable to say what
the price of a transaction is, how can we expect consumers to do so at
the point of sale?
Transactions are not sold in any market. Transactions are engaged
in (as in, engaging in a real estate transaction) but they are not the
product that is bought and sold (it’s the real estate). Sellers do charge
for the service of providing transactions (a real estate broker’s commission), which is what Amex did on the merchant side. The beauty of
prices and markets is that they provide buyers with information and
alternatives. Focusing on unpriced “transactions” that are not bought
and not sold provides neither.
Once the Court accepted the idea that transactions are the unit on
which to focus, however, the plaintiffs’ case fell apart. Increased prices
at the end of the transaction told the Court nothing because the increase did not account for what happened at the beginning, even leading the Court to disregard the district court’s finding that cardholder
benefits did not increase during the time that Amex was raising prices
80. Id. at 2288 (“[P]laintiffs failed to offer any reliable measure of Amex’s transaction
price or profit margins”).
81. See id.
82. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 37, 41, 44, 50, 61–62, 65
(“[A]nd what I’ve said over and over again here is the product is the transaction”).
83. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2285–86.
84. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“[N]either party has presented a reliable measure of American Express’s twosided price that appropriately accounts for the value or cost of the rewards paid to
cardholders.”).
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to merchants (which would mean that the “net price,” whatever it was,
must have increased by at least some amount).85
Further, if the plaintiffs were right that prices increased, shouldn’t
output have decreased? The Court pointed out, however, that the
number of transactions actually increased during this period,86 and
took from that the idea that American Express couldn’t have had market power because market power comes only from the ability to raise
price “by restricting output.”87 In oral argument Chief Justice Roberts
demolished the idea that the increase in transactions tells us something about Amex’s power to raise price, “[T]hat has so many factors
. . . [I]f the economy grows, then the output of your product, credit card
transactions, grows, right?”88 Nevertheless, the increase in transactions allowed the Court to shift its emphasis from price effects to output effects and conclude that the plaintiffs had not shown
anticompetitive harm.
C.

Muddying the Waters

After writing that plaintiffs had “not satisfied the first step of the
rule of reason” and had “not carried their burden of proving . . . anticompetitive effects,” the Court added, “Amex’s business model has
spurred robust interbrand competition and has increased the quality
and quantity of credit-card transactions.”89 But why is the Court discussing interbrand competition? Aren’t effects on interbrand competition procompetitive justifications to be raised by a defendant in Step
Two?
But wait, there’s more. In the immediately preceding paragraph
the Court wrote this:
Lastly, there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about Amex’s antisteering
provisions. These agreements actually stem negative externalities in the
credit-card market and promote interbrand competition. When merchants
steer cardholders away from Amex at the point of sale, it undermines the
cardholder’s expectation of “welcome acceptance”—the promise of a frictionless transaction. A lack of welcome acceptance at one merchant makes a card85. Compare id. (concluding that evidence showed that Amex’s “price increases were
not wholly offset by additional rewards expenditures or otherwise passed through
to cardholders, and resulted in a higher net price”) with Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2288
(“Even assuming the plaintiffs are correct” that the increase was not entirely
spent on cardholder rewards).
86. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“[O]utput of credit-card transactions grew dramatically from 2008 to 2013”). Counsel for Amex hammered home this point in oral
argument. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 41 (“Output of
the product has soared.”).
87. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (quoting the Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise, but adding emphasis).
88. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 41–42.
89. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2290.
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holder less likely to use Amex at all other merchants. This externality
endangers the viability of the entire Amex network.90

Again, the promotion of interbrand competition is an issue normally handled at Step Two in the analysis, procompetitive justifications. Even more curiously, to support its argument that “welcome
acceptance” endangers the viability of Amex’s network, the Court cites
to the district court opinion at the very page where the district court
calls the “welcome acceptance” argument “Amex’s primary pro-competitive justification for the restraints.”91
Finally, and even more curiously, the Court takes what might be a
plausible argument for a procompetitive justification that a defendant
could put forward to justify applying a rule of reason and presents it
as if it were proved true. But this was not a case about whether the
rule of reason should be applied, like BMI, California Dental, or
Leegin.92 This case was fully litigated under the rule of reason, not as
a per se case, and the defendant was given the opportunity to prove
that its contractual restriction actually advanced competition.
At this task, Amex failed. First, the district court rejected Amex’s
argument that any diminution of “welcome acceptance” caused by
steering would lead to a “downward spiral” in Amex’s business as customers deserted the Amex card for its competitors’ cards. No “direct
evidence” from experts or financial analysts established that without
NDPs Amex would “cease to be an effective competitor” and even the
testimony from various Amex executives regarding the “viability of
Amex’s current business model in a market in which merchant steering is permitted was notably inconsistent.”93 Second, the NDP suppressed interbrand competition on the merchant side (among Visa,
Mastercard, and Discovery) as well as intrabrand competition (among
other merchants accepting Amex). This made it unlike other cases justifying distribution restraints (which involved a tradeoff between intra- and inter-brand competition) and revealed a deficiency in Amex’s
proof: “Defendants’ argument that net competition in the credit card
industry will decline if its NDPs are eliminated fails to consider the
likely increase in inter-brand competition on the merchant side . . .
that would result from unlocking price competition in the network ser90. Id. at 2289 (quoting United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 156
(E.D.N.Y. 2015)) (emphasis added).
91. See id. (citing United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 156).
92. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (rule
of reason should be applied, rejecting per se rule); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756 (1999) (rule of reason should be applied, rejecting quick look); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (rule of reason should
be applied, rejecting per se rule).
93. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Justice
Breyer picked up this point in his dissent, noting that the majority had ignored
the district court’s factual finding. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2303.
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vices market.”94 Third, the district court saw the argument about
“ready acceptance” as an argument relating to competition “in the interrelated card issuance market,” a “separate, though, intertwined,
antitrust market.”95 This would then require out-of-market balancing,
which the district court viewed as impermissible under Supreme
Court precedent.96 “[E]ven if such cross-market balancing is appropriate under the rule of reason in a two-sided context,” the district court
wrote, Amex “failed to establish that the NDPs are reasonably necessary to robust competition on the cardholder side of the [credit card]
platform, or that any such gains offset the harm done in the network
services [merchant] market.”97
The Court’s discussion of Amex’s procompetitive justification, even
though the Court purported to stop at Step One of the rule of reason
analysis, had important consequences for the decision in the case. The
reason for the separate steps in the rule of reason analysis is to allocate properly the burdens of proof in antitrust litigation to the parties
best able to address them. Plaintiffs should not be tasked with dreaming up and disproving all possible justifications that a defendant could
raise in support of restraints that have proven adverse effects on competition. If there is a really good justification for a restraint, let the
defendant prove it. The burden will still be on the plaintiff to show
that, on balance, competition is harmed.
D.

The Bottom Line: An Analytical Mess

The Court did not follow its own analytical roadmap in deciding
the case. It actually could have. Having defined the market to include
effects on merchant services and card issuance, and having found no
proof of anticompetitive effect in that market because output increased, why didn’t the Court just stop there?
The answer may be that the Court added a reference to the promotion of inter-brand competition because it was Amex’s narrative that
actually drove its decision, not the facts proved in the litigation and
not the three-step analytical approach and the doctrinal contours of
the rule of reason. That narrative was actually simple. Amex competes
with Visa and Master Card. Its business model is different and relies
on big spenders who get various “rewards” for their spending, rather
than relying on impecunious card holders who can’t pay off their bills
each month and end up paying high finance charges.98 Amex needs
94. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 228 n.52, 230.
95. See id. at 226, 229.
96. See id. at 229, n.54 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963)).
97. See id. at 229–30.
98. Id. at 159 (explaining that Amex’s “lend-centric” competitors generate more than
half their revenue from interest charged on revolving balances).
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high prices to merchants to make all this work, which means that
without the high prices interbrand competition would suffer. The
Court eventually fit this narrative into its analysis, paying no attention to the dissent’s point that the Court’s decision protected competitors, not competition.99
Analytical structures are intended to produce careful analysis. By
muddying the waters of the basic structure of the rule of reason, the
Court ended up with an opinion that did not carefully answer the core
questions of the case: How were consumers hurt? How should we
weigh harm to some consumers (merchants, as intermediate buyers,
and their customers) against possible gains to others (consumers who
buy credit cards)?
IV. THE RULE OF REASON AND MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS
Most economists who have written about platforms have done so in
broad terms; they also do not necessarily distinguish closely between
two-sided “platforms” and two-sided “markets.” Rochet and Tirole, for
example, acknowledge that two-sidedness exists in many industries
and that “the crucial challenge for the platforms is to get both sides of
the market ‘on board,’ while making a profit overall.”100 Determining
the optimal price on both sides, they point out, is a “business decision”
that “is quite complex.”101
Economists worry about how to model economic phenomena and
whether their models work. They do not necessarily worry about legal
issues and how their models should be reflected in the issues on which
antitrust courts must focus. The Supreme Court in American Express,
however, had to take the economists’ models and fit them to antitrust
law. In doing so the Court tried to confine its decision to what it
termed a two-sided transaction platform, one with “more pronounced
indirect network effects and interconnected pricing and demand,”102
rather than have the decision apply to all to industries that could be
described as “two-sided.” As a result, it will now be the task of lawyers
in future litigation to argue about which platforms will be considered
transactional ones, and, thus, single markets according to American
Express, and which platforms will still be seen as involving separate
markets on separate sides of the platform.103
99. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2303 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the Determination
of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 69, 72
(2003).
101. Id.
102. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (2018).
103. Compare US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 27358
(2d Cir. 2019) (holding that, under Amex, computerized network used by travel
agents to book airline flights is a “transaction platform” that must include both
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Defining the market is not the end of the inquiry that American
Express has set us on. The next question will involve assessing the net
effect on both sides of market. If the platform is seen as a two-sided
market (American Express), then the plaintiff will bear the initial burden of proving the net effect. If the platform is seen as two markets,
then the question of how (or whether) to net the benefits will not arise
until Step Three, and only after the defendant has shown in Step Two
that there are competitive benefits and that these benefits survive a
less restrictive alternative test.
No matter how the burden of proof is allocated, however, netting
the benefits is complicated, but we do have some guidance on this issue from outside the United States on how to net the benefits in platform litigation. In 2014 the European Court of Justice decided two
cases involving payments systems platforms. One case involved the
interchange fee that MasterCard charged to acquiring banks, which
then became part of the merchant charge (and was passed on to consumers who bought from merchants).104 The other case, decided the
same day, involved a pricing rule of a French association managing
bank card issuance and ATM business, adopted to incentivize card issuers to expand their acquisition business and thereby increase the
size of the network accepting the cards.105
There are three key points in comparing the EU approach to the
Supreme Court’s approach in American Express. First, the European
Court of Justice analyzed these cases as involving separate markets,
not one.106 Second, although the legal issues in the two European
cases were different,107 the Court of Justice in both cases wrote that
the competitive analysis must take account of effects in both markets.

104.
105.
106.

107.

travel agents and airlines; remands for retrial based in evidence presented to jury
of net harm to airline company plaintiff even accounting for benefits to travel
agents) with In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 153318, *27–29 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2018) (rejecting economist’s proposed “multi-sided market for college education” that balances pricing to “numerous constituencies”; “not analogous” to two-sided market recognized in American
Express) (suit alleging NCAA and member conferences fixed prices for payments
made to student athletes).
Case C-382/12 P, Mastercard v. Comm’n, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0382
(Sept. 11, 2014).
Case C-67/13 P, Carte Bancaire v Comm’n, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0067
(Sept. 11, 2014).
See Mastercard, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0382 at ¶ 11 (finding three markets, an inter-systems market, an issuing market, and an acquiring market);
Carte Bancaire, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0067 at ¶¶ 8, 76–78 (not disagreeing that the issuance of payment cards could be a relevant market).
Mastercard involved the applicability of the first condition of Article 101(3),
which exempts a restraint from Article 101(1) if it “contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods.” See, e.g., Mastercard, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 0382 at ¶ 230. Carte Bancaire involved the question whether the network’s rule should be considered a restriction by object (per se) or by effect (re-
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The Court reasoned that if as a general matter “interactions” between
a relevant market and a “different related market” must be considered, then “all the more so” when the interactions are between “two
facets of a two-sided system.”108 Third, where there is interaction between the two sides of a system, an assessment must be made as to
“whether such advantages [on one side] are of such a character as to
compensate for the disadvantages which that measure entails for competition.”109 Still, this does not involve a netting of the benefits in one
market against the harm in the other, but rather an assessment of
whether the benefits in one market provide “appreciable objective advantages” in the restrained market, particularly “where the consumers on those markets are not substantially the same.”110
The imprecise language regarding tradeoffs that the Court of Justice used in Mastercard has been taken to mean that there is only a
“limited scope” for considering cross-market efficiencies under EU law
particularly where different groups of consumers are affected.111 Similarly, European Commission guidelines recognize that although negative effects in one market normally cannot be balanced against
positive effects in another, where “two markets are related,” efficiency
tradeoffs are possible but only where the “group of consumers affected
by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially the same.”112
U.S. antitrust law and practice has viewed cross-market tradeoffs
either with caution or as completely improper.113 Although the reason
for not making such tradeoffs has sometimes been viewed in administrability terms,114 the deeper reason is that tradeoffs between different groups of consumers are inherently problematic. We might be
willing to make the tradeoff in inter/intrabrand settings, where the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

114.

quiring proof of economic effect). See, e.g., Carte Bancaire, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 0067 at ¶¶ 29, 87–88.
Carte Bancaire, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0067 at ¶ 79. See Mastercard,
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0382 at ¶ 237.
See Mastercard, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0382 at ¶ 237.
Id. at ¶ 242.
See Cyril Ritter, Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: Looking at the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Amex Case from an EU Perspective, 10 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC.
172, 178 (2019).
Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty,
2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, 103 ¶ 43 (refers to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union; note that Article 81(3) is now Article 101(3)).
Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES at 30 n.14 (2010) (explaining that in considering merger efficiencies, the
Agencies, at their discretion, will consider “efficiencies not strictly in the relevant
market, but so inextricably linked” that divestiture would sacrifice them).
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Our inability
to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.”).
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group of consumers is roughly the same (all television set buyers, for
example). In cases like American Express, however, that easy congruence is not present because all consumers, even those who pay with
cash, are affected on the merchant side, at least to some extent, but
only Amex cardholders are benefited on the issuance side, certainly a
group that is different, smaller, and likely wealthier.
V. MISSING IN ACTION: THE CONSUMER
WELFARE STANDARD
The debate over the goals of antitrust—consumer welfare v. public
interest—did have its effect on the Court’s decision in American Express. On one level, the Court’s decision appears to embrace the consumer welfare standard. Closer examination, however, shows some
confusion about what this standard means and even how to advance
consumer welfare in the context of antitrust litigation.
The Court’s emphasis on output effects, and its conclusion that
output actually increased while the antisteering restriction was in effect,115 certainly echoes Justice Gorsuch’s opening point about the importance of restrictions on output and the deadweight welfare loss.
Justice Gorsuch’s almost throw-away point about not protecting
merchants also showed up in the Court’s disregard for the increased
prices that merchants paid for the services Amex provided.116
Is this the “consumer welfare” standard Bork argued for? If consumer welfare is really all about efficiency, as Bork suggested, then
how can one disregard the increase of input prices to intermediate
sellers? Doesn’t this assume that we don’t care whether intermediate
sellers engage in inefficient input substitution (say, dropping Amex as
a form of payment)? If it’s about deadweight welfare loss, isn’t simple
price theory powerful enough to allow us to assume that output will be
affected, at least to some extent, in downstream markets as retailers
spread their increased costs for Amex cards over all customers?117 A
price increase of $1.3 billion to merchants over a five-year period is not
nothing.118 Why don’t we count this as an adverse effect on output?
Indeed, why doesn’t the Court consider the merchants to be “consumers” whose welfare deserves protection, particularly in light of its view
115. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77.
117. Both the district court and the dissent made this point about price effects in
downstream markets, see Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018); United States v.
Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (“Merchants facing increased credit card
acceptance costs will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their
customers in the form of higher retail prices.”).
118. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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that cardholders and merchants “jointly consume a single product,
payment card transactions”?119
What is even more dissonant in terms of the consumer welfare goal
is the Court’s invocation of the benefits that Amex has provided to
poor people in today’s “credit-card market.” The Court wrote that
Amex had “influenced” the credit-card market by making card-payment services available to “low-income individuals, who otherwise
could not qualify for a credit card and could not afford the fees that
traditional banks charge.”120 The Court did not particularly elaborate
on this point, not explaining what type of product Amex provided (presumably at a profit) or how such efforts related to the antisteering
restriction, which, after all, is intended to keep wealthy big spenders
happy with merchants’ “ready acceptance” of their Amex cards.121
Why did the Court include this reference to Amex’s effort to help
the unbanked? It is probably safe to assume that the Court did not
advance this argument on distributional grounds, something that
would be more consistent with a “public interest” standard than a
“consumer welfare” standard. Indeed, were that what the Court had in
mind, it would surely have paid more attention to the price increases
Amex imposed on small businesses and “everyday spend” retailers,
where poorer customers might spend their money, and it would have
paid more attention to the regressive consequences of taxing relatively
poor cash payers to fund travel to Tahiti by relatively rich Amex card
holders.122
Closer examination of the Court’s opinion indicates that the Court
referred to Amex’s effort to reach out to low-income consumers as a
way to show that output increased and quality improved during the
antisteering regime, both effects presumably being consistent with a
119. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Benjamin
Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 583 (2006)). The district
court explicitly treated merchants as consumers, see supra note 30.
120. Id. at 2282. The Court made a second similar reference, see id. at 2289 (Amex has
“increased the availability of card services, including free banking and card payment services available to low-income customers who otherwise would not be
served.”).
121. The Court may have been referring to Amex’s “Blue Bird” card, co-branded with
Walmart, that provides certain banking and credit-card services to consumers
without bank accounts. See Brief for Respondent at 5, Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454) (provides services “to people ‘in poor communities where traditional banks do not want to serve them.’ ”). The Blue Bird card
is a pre-paid cash card, with a variety of benefits. See BLUE BIRD, https://www
.bluebird.com/ [https://perma.unl.edu/66Y5-LZK7] (last visited July 5, 2019). The
district court’s opinion made no reference to services to low-income consumers or
to the Blue Bird card.
122. A point made by the district court, see United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F.
Supp. 3d 143, 216–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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consumer welfare standard.123 But this only serves to underline the
point that the consumer welfare standard is ambiguous at its core,
inviting open-ended litigation over how to define and measure output
and quality. Having accepted serving poorer consumers as a quality
improvement, does this mean that the Court would then count the issuance of environmentally friendly cards as a plus for consumer welfare because the “quality” of the card had improved? Or higher wages
for workers in the credit card industry, which might lead to more
workers qualifying for credit cards, thereby increasing output? Could
these be justifications for anticompetitive restraints (or worse, arguments that a plaintiff will need to disprove at Step One)?
The real mystery with the consumer welfare standard, however, is
its application in a way that ignores consumers. This is nowhere more
evident than in the American Express case itself. Justice Breyer
started out his opinion extolling markets as the institution that decides the optimal mix of goods and services in the economy, not government and not business. Markets do not make decisions, consumers
do. If markets are to work, consumers need price information so that
they can decide and so that they can make choices. Not once does the
dissent mention consumer sovereignty, however; nor does the dissent
draw support from prior cases where the denial of information critical
to making an economic choice was found to violate the antitrust
laws.124 With so much attention being paid to the broad trade-off between prices to merchants and benefits to cardholders, attention to
the importance of decisions by actual consumers got lost.
Justice Sotomayor saw the point clearly in oral argument, however. In a colloquy with counsel for Amex, Justice Sotomayor pointed
out that as a consumer “if I go to a cash register and the merchant
says to me, I’ll give you a 1% discount today if you don’t use Amex, I
sit there and think to myself, do I need the airplane rewards or the
train rewards, or do I want the 1%?” Counsel for Amex responded that
choosing the discount means that she would have fewer rewards in
total and so would have “paid a price increase,” to which Justice
Sotomayor responded, “You’re making my choice for me. You’re not

123. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2289 (arguing that Amex’s antisteering provision had not
“stifled competition among credit-card companies,” noting Amex’s “business
model” had increased the availability of card services, including services to lowincome customers) (citing D. EVANS & R. SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC:
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 88–89 (2d ed. 2005)).
124. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (boycott to prevent insurance companies from getting information relevant to insurance coverage); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (agreement to prevent
engineers from including price information when bidding on jobs to customers).
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giving me the choice. And that’s what price competition is about, my
choice, not your choice.”125
Had the Court paid more attention to this aspect of consumer welfare, the case would have looked quite different. Individual consumers
should be able to make individual choices between Amex’s rewards
and some other credit card company’s rewards. Some would certainly
still use their Amex card, others might have different preferences.
Amex’s card would succeed in the marketplace if it attracted more consumers than it repelled. How is that not the essence of consumer
welfare?
VI. CONCLUSION
The epigraph with which this Article begins encapsulates the real
consumer welfare prescription for the antitrust laws today. When Senator Klobuchar writes that “antitrust enforcement affects more than
just price and output,” I think she means that antitrust is not just
about an abstract proposition of welfare economics. It is about “our
everyday lives, from the price of groceries at the market to the cost of
prescription drugs.”
The concern that the consumer welfare standard expresses is a
concern for consumers. The core of this concern is price, not output. It
is not by chance that Senator Klobuchar talks about our everyday
lives and, particularly, prescription drugs. If the antitrust laws were
only about output restrictions, in fact, we might not even care so much
about high drug prices because the demand for pharmaceutical drugs,
like the demand for other necessities, is highly inelastic. This would
lead to the perverse result of downplaying high drug prices because
these high prices might have little effect on output.126 Surely output
effect, in itself, cannot be the goal of the antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to argue that antitrust should be
concerned with low prices just because low prices are good for consumers’ pocketbooks. Bork chose the phrase “consumer welfare” as a
125. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 34–37. The district court also made
this point. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 220 (“Ultimately, and essentially, it is the customer’s decision whether to accept the
merchant’s offer or to pay with his or her card of choice.”).
126. The possibility that deadweight loss in the economy from monopoly pricing is
small is an old criticism of antitrust, see Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 77 (1954), criticized
in Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27,
43–45 (2003). Glick points out that the common law took the opposite view, condemning monopolies with low elasticities where dead-weight loss would be low.
See Glick, supra note 24, at 491–92. See also Harry First, Private Interest and
Public Control: Government Action, The First Amendment, and the Sherman Act,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 9, 11–15 (1975) (describing early regulation of rates of monopoly public utilities).
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polemicist, not as an economist, because he recognized that associating his antitrust outcomes with what is good for consumers made his
arguments more powerful. He appealed to something that sounded
like it would be good for all of us.
The appeal to “all of us” should today be taken as an appeal for a
more democratic antitrust, one that looks not just to growing the economy but to distributing its benefits more widely.127 Some of the benefits of a consumer welfare approach are economic. Lower prices ensure
that the consumer surplus is in the pockets of consumers, not producers. Some of those benefits, however, also have to do with economic
liberty, the ability of consumers to make private choices as to what
they think is in their best interest.
The goals of antitrust cannot be divorced from economics and economic outcomes, but they also should not be divorced from democratic
concerns, particularly individual choice and a more democratic distribution of economic gains.128 As the debate between Justice Gorsuch
and Justice Breyer reminds us, a narrow view of consumer welfare did
not always hold sway in interpreting the antitrust laws. As the
Court’s opinion in American Express makes evident, this narrow view
of consumer welfare does not even provide sure guidance for deciding
specific cases.
American Express was a good case for advancing the real interests
of consumers. It is one of those rare cases fully litigated under the rule
of reason; it is one of those rare Section 1 civil cases brought by the
Justice Department. The district court’s findings made clear how consumers were hurt, both financially and in terms of their ability to
choose the products they want. It is unfortunate that the Supreme
Court allowed its interpretation of the latest economic theories to distort the application of the rule of reason and reach a result that
harms, not helps, the consumers that the antitrust laws were intended to protect.

127. See Glick, supra note 24, at 489 (preventing redistribution of consumer surplus to
producers can be justified as a way to diminish “the negative social consequences
from income inequality”).
128. For the argument that the Sherman Act was intended to prevent the redistribution of consumer surplus to firms with market power, see Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 94, 96 (1982) (explaining
that higher prices to consumers were condemned “because they unfairly extracted wealth from consumers” and Congress “also condemned the unequal distribution of wealth resulting from monopolistic overcharges”).

